↔P2Priv 8 entries · updated 2026-11-01

Android VPN lockdown: two system paths that can leak your IP

What Android VPN lockdown blocks, how QUIC and NAT-T leaks bypass it, and which settings, updates and checks help limit IP exposure.

P2Priv Editorial Team · 5 min read

Keep “Always-on VPN” and “Block connections without VPN” enabled—but do not treat them as proof that your public IP can never escape. Researchers have documented two Android system paths that an installed app can misuse to send packets outside an active VPN. The receiving server can then see your underlying network’s public IP rather than the VPN exit address. Mullvad’s QUIC advisory and NAT-T advisory describe the failures.

These reports do not establish that every ordinary app connection bypasses the VPN. They concern specific system features that can be deliberately abused. Here is what to enable, what remains exposed, and what you can check.

Status checked: October 24, 2026.

What the two Android settings do

Android distinguishes between keeping the VPN service running and blocking traffic outside it:

  • Always-on VPN starts the VPN service at boot and keeps it running. The VPN app remains responsible for connecting to its gateway.
  • Block connections without VPN, also called VPN lockdown, is intended to block network traffic that does not use the VPN.

Those are the documented controls in Android’s VPN guide. Always-on alone is not the blocking setting.

To enable them, open Settings → Network & internet → VPN, open your VPN’s options, then enable both switches. Menu names vary by device; searching Settings for “VPN” is often easier. If the switches are unavailable, the VPN app may not support always-on mode—Android allows apps to opt out.

These controls remain useful. The problem is that some traffic sent by Android on an app’s behalf can avoid the rules governing the app’s own connections.

Two different leaks—not one universal fix

QUIC connection-close payloads

The registerQuicConnectionClosePayload feature lets Android send a final message when an app’s QUIC socket is destroyed. The reported flaw lets an app register attacker-controlled bytes that the system sends over the physical network, outside the VPN. This can reveal the public source IP and carry an app-chosen payload.

IVPN independently reproduced the issue and identifies the affected path in Android 16 QPR1+ builds where the feature is enabled. It reports that the default was off in an April 2026 patched build, but the code path remained; it also reports the same interface on Android 17. Consequently, “Android 16” alone is not enough to determine exposure: the feature’s effective state matters. See IVPN’s technical advisory.

Hardware-offloaded NAT-T keepalives

NAT-T keepalives are small periodic packets intended to keep an IPsec connection usable through a router. An ordinary app can request hardware-offloaded keepalives to an Internet destination on UDP port 4500, bypassing VPN lockdown. Mullvad explains the offload path.

The researcher reports direct confirmation over Wi-Fi on three Android 16 phones: Pixel 8 Pro, Samsung Galaxy Z Fold7 and Nothing Phone (3a). The broader affected-device assessment rests on source and firmware analysis, not tests of every model. This is a fixed periodic signal, not an arbitrary-data tunnel, but the destination can still learn the network’s public IP. See the original research.

Neither attack requires root or special privileged permissions. Switching VPN providers should not be treated as a repair for these Android-level paths.

What to do now

1. Install system updates and check the actual fix

Look for release notes addressing the specific path, rather than assuming that a recent security-patch date resolves it.

For GrapheneOS, the official changelog records:

  • 2026050400: disabled the QUIC connection-close optimization to fix a VPN leak.
  • 2026100200: disabled unprivileged hardware keepalives because they create a VPN leak.

Both changes are documented in GrapheneOS’s release history. Its NAT-T fix has therefore progressed beyond the “working on a fix” status in Mullvad’s advisory. These are fixes for the named paths, not a promise against every possible leak.

2. For QUIC, inspect or disable the feature with ADB

This is an advanced mitigation, not a routine VPN-app setting. Only proceed if you are comfortable using Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to change a system setting. Use a trusted computer and follow Android’s ADB setup instructions: install Platform Tools, enable USB debugging, connect the phone and approve that computer’s debugging key.

To inspect the effective state, run:

adb shell dumpsys connectivity

Look for Close QUIC connection: false. The researcher’s repository identifies that output as the feature being disabled; if it already says false, this path is disabled on the current build. Missing output is not equivalent to a confirmed disabled state.

To disable the feature, Mullvad and IVPN document:

adb shell device_config put tethering close_quic_connection -1
adb reboot

After reboot, inspect the state again. Turn USB debugging off when finished.

Mullvad cautions that the setting persists across reboots but may be undone by system updates. Disabling it removes graceful QUIC shutdown, leaving the server-side connection to time out. This command does not fix the NAT-T keepalive leak.

3. Reduce exposure to untrusted apps

Both reports concern deliberate abuse by installed apps. Remove apps you do not trust; lockdown is not a substitute for trusting the software running on your device.

For NAT-T, Mullvad discusses filling the hardware’s limited keepalive slots as a theoretical mitigation, but explicitly says it is not guaranteed to work. Do not mistake slot reservation for an Android repair.

What a leak check can—and cannot—prove

A browser IP check showing the VPN address verifies that browser request’s route. It does not exercise either of these system paths, so it cannot certify the whole phone as leak-free.

For lawful peer-to-peer use, check the application’s actual connections as well: peer traffic, tracker requests and discovery traffic may need separate verification. A controlled test should use a device and receiving endpoint you own, with observation at the receiver or physical network boundary—not only inside the VPN tunnel, which the reported packets bypass.

The privacy boundary is specific: an outside destination may learn your underlying public IP, but that does not automatically reveal your name or exact location. See what other peers can see for that distinction. Keep lockdown enabled, address the named system paths, and treat each successful test as evidence about the traffic it actually checked.